I am writing this post in response to a question that was raised by Nick a few days ago,

1) as to whether the white sorghum and cassava that our project aims to process will be used in making alcohol, 2) whether the increase in production of white sorghum and cassava that will result from the installation of our intended processing facility might lead to increased production of alcohol (and potentially reduce local prices), or 3) if this might also lead to many local people brewing alcohol from these crops. 

Other people also said “it is harder to do cost effectiveness analysis for speculative projects [like this] than it is to do it for disease prevention (e.g. malaria nets)”. 

So, towards the end of this post, I am also going to explain if this particular project — a grain cleaning, drying and storage facility working on crops like sorghum, maize etc — is precedented, i.e., if there are other already existing examples of projects doing the same work in rural poor communities like ours here in Uganda, and what their numbers have been (what it cost them to get established, how many people they are impacting).

Others have said “it’s even difficult for us to assess the relative extent of informed public support for a grassroots project from a far”, i.e. whether such a project is something that local people wish to see in their communities. Below are my answers to these questions.

But in any case:

I am asking the people from EA to do everything possible to help us install this grain facility. Following my original post three weeks ago, a few people on this forum have expressed strong support for our intended grain facility, and have said they "would encourage EA funders to give this proposal a fair shot". 

One of them, named Roddy, who even donated $200 to our project (the UCF) after reading my original post, has even said he is very willing to work together with other EAs to do a cost-effectiveness analysis of this facility, and that he is very willing to provide funding. I am asking every EA who is reading this, to work together with people like Roddy, to give us the chance to see some good. To me, this will be transformational.

Putting the grip of poverty in our region as a whole aside, I come from an extended family that isn’t really a family. By extended family, I mean all the people in my immediate family, and my entire clan combined (as I once said in The Guardian).

Even now as I speak, in 2024, many of the people I call relatives in my home village of Kagulu, in Buyende (where I was born), are still finding it very hard to merely pay tuition of just Ugx30,000 - Ugx50,000 ($8 - $14) for their kids who are in primary school.

This money is equivalent to the Ugx 45,000 (or $12) that I was paying in secondary school back in 1998, when I dropped out because my mom couldn’t afford it. In other words, nothing has changed in our circumstances in those two and a half decades. And although I am using my extended family as an example, the fact is: every other rural household that you can visit in Kamuli and Buyende, and also elsewhere in Busoga, is battling life the same way. 

Whenever I look at all these things, it is why at times I sound very pointed in my writings (it is only a natural reflex). But in real life, I am a very humble, even shy person. You can ask the people from The Life You Can Save* who visited us in 2023. 

(*My project has no connection whatsoever with The Life You Can Save. However, their former executive Director, Charlie Bresler, has been supporting our work since 2016, only in a personal capacity, not as part of the Life You Can Save. Here is a photo of me hosting the people from The Life You Can Save. More photos in these 3 tweets: 1, 2, 3.

All I want is to do my part on ultra poverty: 

Before becoming a farmer, I was a teacher at a local primary school here in Kamuli. Teaching itself was only a very slight chance that came my way after Uganda's gov't introduced free teacher education in 2001, after I had dropped out of school in 1998. 

Although the teaching profession, too, left me very poor, and unable to even get what to eat, at least the little knowledge I acquired in the process, is what has now enabled me to engage with the global antipoverty world as I am doing now — and is what I am asking the people from EA to help me put to use, to bring about some change in our region. 

Before teaching, I was a total failure. For this reason, I have a firm belief that, if I end up staying on this planet for some time, but still not manage to do anything on the grip of poverty in our region, it will be the equivalent of me having never lived in the first place. Why? Because my own ordeal (that's, my own lifelong battle with ultra poverty, and the lessons I picked from it), will have served no purpose.

EA supporting our intended grain facility will mean a lot. Let’s really do it.

Currently, our region Busoga as a whole, which comprises 11 districts (of which Kamuli & Buyende are a part), is known for only one thing: sugarcane growing. Busoga is also currently the biggest producer of sugarcane in Uganda.

The most immediate result has been threefold: 1) increased hunger, as said here, here, and also here, because every household is growing sugarcane, yet sugarcane can’t be eaten as food 2). increased poverty, because sugarcane takes two years to mature and 3) even when the sugarcane finally matures, there are times when prices fall to the extent that a farmer literally earns nothing, because every farmer is growing the same crop.

Feeling the wrath of monoculture:

Between 2020-2022, due to monoculture/oversupply, and a permit policy that effectively stopped farmers from supplying their cane directly to millers, most sugarcane buyers in Busoga had started buying “per field”, i.e., per acre, not per ton (as one farmer says here), and were paying farmers as little as Ugx50,000 ($14) for a full acre that has about 40 tons. Others were paying farmers as little as Ugx30,000 ($8) for a full Tata truck that has over 10 tons, as mentioned in this facebook post.

In turn, farmers lost hope and cut down their sugarcane plantations en masse. Other farmers started selling it as firewood, as Jinja City highlights in another facebook post. As a result, sugarcane became very scarce across Busoga in 2022 and 2023, and it is the only reason sugarcane prices have now gone back to the current Ugx 175,000 per ton as of Feb 2024, which is also only temporary, and which is already dropping even now.

The new jiggers, a.k.a, sugarcane:

A decade ago, every part of Busoga was infested with a severe jigger outbreak, as a direct result of poor housing conditions especially in Busoga’s rural areas, poor hygiene, and the biting poverty here. This still happens every now and then, even as recently as 2016, and 2022. But today, most people believe sugarcane is the new jiggers in Busoga. That’s, most people believe the misery that sugarcane is unraveling on the rural poor here in Busoga, is the direct successor of the pain that used to come from jiggers. 

Most importantly, only those farmers who have large swaths of land are the ones who have been able to benefit from sugarcane, yet most farmers in our region have less than 3 acres, as the Monitor points out here.

The REAL problem though isn’t simply sugarcane:

The real problem is the fact that farmers in our region depend only on agriculture for survival, but they simply have no markets for their produce, and it is why every farmer has chosen to grow the only crop (sugarcane) that has a relatively ready market — which crop a) also happens to exacerbate hunger because it can’t be eaten as food, yet every farmer is growing the same, and b) is almost exclusively bought by only one category of buyers (i.e. sugarcane millers), leaving rural poor farmers with no options.

With all of this in mind:

I have spent the last 8 years trying to find support for an INTEGRATED agro-processing plant that would create new market linkages for at least six different types of crops,  and thus enable the rural poor in our region to diversify their incomes and escape poverty. 

White sorghum, which we are already working on with rural farmers in Kamuli & Buyende — and which is the main crop for which we are seeking a grain facility — is only part of the 6+ crops that our intended INTEGRATED agro-processing plant, if installed, will be working on. This means, the grain facility that we are currently asking EA to help us install, is also only part of our intended integrated agro-processing plant.

Our intended INTEGRATED plant, if installed, will not only help place the rural poor in our region on a self-sustainable path from  poverty — by creating market linkages for various crops, minimizing postharvest food losses, and creating new jobs — but also, since all the crops that this plant will be getting local farmers to grow on a large scale (cassava, sorghum, maize, mangoes, pineapples, passion fruits etc) are food crops, this plant will contribute signicantly to food security in our region, undoing sugarcane's ills.

Incidentally, a 2021 news report by Uganda’s The Independent said: “for Busoga to get out of the current poverty cycle, there will be need to diversify and find new crops for farmers other than the whole region cultivating one perennial crop [sugarcane].”

It is why I am very earnestly asking EA to help us install our intended grain facility, to give the rural poor in our region at least a second crop (sorghum) that has a mainstream market in the agri-value chain. Let’s really do this, whatever the circumstances.

Now the questions you have asked:   

Question #1:  Will the white sorghum and cassava that our project aims to process be used in making alcohol? 

True, both the white sorghum and cassava, i.e., High Quality Cassava Flour (HQCF) that our project aims to process are used in making beer. More on this later. Note though:

a) The grain facility that we are asking EA to help us install, will only work on crops like sorghum, maize, millet, and beans, not cassava. Our work on cassava and HQCF (including the supply of high-yielding cassava varieties to our target farmers) will only begin after we have installed a cassava starch facility, which is part of the INTEGRATED plant that we aim to have in the end.

b) White sorghum and HQCF aren’t simply used for making beer. They are also bought by all the international charities that provide food relief in Africa e.g. in refugee camps, schools, hospitals etc. These include World Vision, GOAL, UNHCR, Red Cross, and the UN’s World Food Program (WFP). With grains alone, WFP is currently the biggest buyer in Africa, including in Uganda — and sorghum is one of the grains they buy. Other crops the WFP buys are maize, beans, peas, rice etc, and the grain facility that we are asking EA to help us install, is capable of cleaning and grading all these crops, besides sorghum.

Moreover, the WFP also has what it calls a “pro-Smallholder Farmer purchasing policy” where they commit to making sure that a certain percentage of all their food purchases comes from rural poor smallholder farmers like those in Kamuli & Buyende, as part of their Purchase for Progress initiative. In 2021, 117,000 metric tons (representing 2.7%) of all food purchases by the WFP came from smallholder farmers, and their current goal is to reach 10% by 2027, as said in this PDF (see page 5). 

c) Apart from being used in beer making, and as food by relief agencies like those above, white sorghum also has many other uses, including making of animal feeds. In October 2023, one buyer in Kampala asked us to start supplying them with white sorghum both for export and for their work on animal feeds. Another big buyer (Agroways), who works with a network of other buyers including USAID, also contacted us about the same.

d) With High Quality Cassava Flour (HQCF), which we will only start working on after installing a cassava starch facility (rather than a grain facility), buyers are innumerable. These include all pharmaceutical manufacturers (of which we have at least twelve in Uganda); all major breweries in Uganda and east Africa; biscuit makers and yogurt producers; paperboard industries and textiles; bakeries and confectioneries; adhesive industries etc – as AfrII explains here. (AfrII is a Ugandan nonprofit that trains those working on projects of this kind, and introduces them to buyers. AfrII is also one of the people the UCF aims to work together with, once we reach specific stages in our work.

Question #2:  

Will the increase in production of white sorghum and cassava that will result from the installation of our intended processing facility lead to increased production of alcohol (and potentially reduce local prices)?

Installing our intended grain facility is indeed going to result in increased production of white sorghum in our region. Also, white sorghum and HQCF, as said earlier, are indeed used for making beer, but NOT the local brew that ordinary Ugandans make. This beer is made by large multinational corporations (AB inBev, Diageo etc) that are operating locally in Uganda and east Africa. These brewers are also our target buyers. 

Currently, our farmers’ sorghum is bought by Uganda Breweries (UBL), a subsidiary of Diageo. We are also already in talks with Nile Breweries (a subsidiary of AB InBev) about the same. Both Uganda Breweries and Nile Breweries are Uganda’s biggest brewers. 

Now, being large corporations, the scale of their work, e.g., the volume of alcohol/beer they make, doesn’t depend on the quantity of produce that local farmers in a place like Busoga can produce. The volume of alcohol they make is the same with or without local farmers’ produce. In fact, these people do not even need local farmers to run their work (it's the local farmers who need them). They already have the capacity to import all their raw materials from anywhere in the world, and it’s what they were doing before.

For example, until 2006, before UBL introduced their Low Raw Materials Program (which they have now renamed “Farm for Success”), nearly 100% of the raw materials they were using to make beer here in Uganda, was imported. This all means, buying local produce is something they are only doing as a favor to local farmers, or as part of their CSR, but this has no impact on whether they will produce more or less alcohol/beer. 

Today, UBL sources 95% of their raw materials locally, including white sorghum, and is aiming to make it 100% by 2030. For Nile, that figure is currently 70%, but is also “aiming for over 95 percent in the near future”, per this World Bank report. In other words, even after deciding to procure all their raw materials from local farmers, which they are only doing as a favor, the quantity of produce that is coming from all local farmers is still below what they need. 

Question #3:   Will this project lead to many local people brewing alcohol from these crops (sorghum, cassava etc), and potentially lead to low prices e.g. of alcohol? 

No. These crops won’t be used to make alcohol by a single ordinary Ugandan, at least not in Busoga. The people who already know how to make beer from these crops, and who have been doing it for long (UBL and Nile), are the ones who will use the white sorghum from our farmers in Kamuli & Buyende or Busoga. This won’t also lead to low prices in any way, because the few brewers that we have today, are going to remain the same.

A related question someone might ask: 

Do local farmers in other parts of Uganda already grow white sorghum (and cassava) that major breweries like Uganda Breweries and Nile are currently using to make beer?

Yes. Farmers in western Uganda, northern Uganda, and the far distant part of eastern Uganda outside of Busoga (e.g. Soroti), are already producing white sorghum, barley, HQCF etc that both UBL and Nile currently use in beer making. But in our region of Busoga, a region the size of Gambia, no single farmer currently supplies anything to any of these breweries — yet Nile, in particular, is located here in Busoga (in Jinja).

With white sorghum, farmers in Kamuli & Buyende, and Busoga as a whole, haven’t been growing it — its cultivation is being promoted for the first time by the UCF. Moreover, when I first approached the Agribusiness Manager for UBL (Joseph Kawuki) back in 2019, to enquire if they would buy white sorghum from our farmers in Kamuli if they grew it, he said he didn’t believe white sorghum can do well in our region.

Today, our farmers’ sorghum in Kamuli & Buyende is doing very well, and good thing, both UBL and Nile are very ready to buy from us (as mentioned above). This is the market we want to tap into, in addition to all the other value chains, to move the ultra poor in our region from poverty, and it is where we are kindly asking for EA’s support.

Question #4:   

One person said “it’s difficult to assess the relative extent of informed public support for a grassroots project from a far”. Question therefore is: does our intended grain facility, or agro-processing in general, have genuine local backing, i.e., is it something local people want to see in their communities? Here is what I can say:

For a country where 80% of the rural population (and 70% of the total workforce) is employed in agriculture — or, in a place like Busoga where the rural poor are trapped with only one crop (sugarcane) yet agriculture is their only source of survival — there is no question that our intended facility is the very kind of thing the rural poor here need.

At national level, Uganda’s president Museveni has made agro-processing the central focus of nearly all of his speeches, whether he is talking to ordinary Ugandans or outside investors. You can see this on his personal website, and in the local media. Whether he is on a foreign visit, agro-processing in Uganda is all he talks about, wherever he goes.

Here in Busoga, projects like this are only a natural calling. For example, following a 2021 report about the high levels of poverty in Busoga, local leaders across the region said “people in Busoga are farmers, most of them grow sugarcane. They don’t have any other source of income, but sugarcane prices dropped because the supply is higher than the demand.” They further pointed out the “low levels of industrialization” i.e., the absence of other agro-processing facilities working on different types of crops, as the reason our entire region depends only on one crop (sugarcane).

This is consistent with a 2021 report by The Independent which said, “for Busoga to get out of the current poverty cycle, there will be need to diversify and find new crops for farmers other than the whole region cultivating one perennial crop” — and projects like the grain facility we are aiming to install, are no doubt one way to create markets for various crops.

Similarly, during a gathering of religious leaders and local politicians from across Busoga, which was held in Namayingo in 2023 (video) to discuss the biting poverty here in Busoga, the most prominent thing every person mentioned was the need for industrialization and agro-processing plants, including for crops like cassava.

A related question people might ask: 

Your project has already built some market linkages, e.g. you are already working with Uganda Breweries to buy your farmers’ sorghum. Why do you still need a grain facility?

First, once we expand our sorghum project to cover every village in Kamuli & Buyende (which is our current goal), the volume of our farmers’ produce will be big, and can’t be handled without any postharvest handling, drying and storage facilities. 

Second, having a grain facility like the one we want to install isn’t simply about convenience in postharvest handling. It is also a market necessity. In poor countries like ours, most food loss occurs at harvest due to poor postharvest systems. But putting aside the income that is lost in the process, poor postharvest systems are also said to be the leading cause of aflatoxin contamination especially in grains, with 75% of Uganda’s grains said to be contaminated with aflatoxins, as said here.

Aflatoxin contamination in food has been blamed for things like cancer, and there are cases where Uganda’s grain produce has been rejected, and even destroyed, due to aflatoxins. “At high doses, aflatoxins can kill, while at chronic exposure, they impact human health, suppressing immune systems, hindering child growth, and even causing liver cancer. They are also highly toxic to livestock and poultry”, says The Monitor.

For this reason, most savvy buyers, e.g. the WFP (the biggest buyer of grains in Africa), have strict guidelines for buying grains like maize and sorghum, and require their food suppliers to have their own established postharvest handling and cleaning facilities.

Question #5:   One person said, “it is harder to do cost effectiveness analysis for speculative projects [like this] than it is to do it for disease prevention (e.g. malaria nets)…it is also harder to do cost effectiveness analysis in terms of lives saved...”.

So question is:  is this particular grain facility (the one we want to install) precendented? That’s, are there other already existing examples of projects doing the same work in rural poor communities like ours here in Uganda, and what have their numbers been (i.e., what did it cost them to get established, how many people they are impacting etc)?

There are many other grain facilities doing similar work here in Uganda, but since many were initiated by foreign investors or wealthy Ugandans -- and are mostly based in big cities like Kampala -- I will only cite one such project that was initiated by another ordinary local farmer (like myself), in exactly the same remote rural setting like ours. 

In a far distant part of eastern Uganda (called Soroti), another local farmer, Ruth Okiror -- who also happens to be a school dropout -- installed in 2012 a grain cleaning, drying and storage facility of exactly the same type that we are aiming to install, except that hers was a secondhand facility that was disposed off by the UN's World Food Program (WFP). Her facility was also installed by the same people (Alvan Blanch) who are going to install our intended facility, if only the people from EA help fund it. 

Result? 

In those 14 years since installing their grain facility, Ruth's project (called Acila Enterprises) has organized 30 farmers groups that have 9,000 farmers in total (i.e., 30 farmers per group), who are currently growing the crops that her facility works on.

And because most institutional buyers of grains (like the WFP) require all their grain suppliers to have grain cleaning and storage facilities as a prerequisite (to ensure that those grains are free from things like aflatoxins) before they can buy them, Ruth's facility has now linked those farmers to a whole array of buyers -- from all the international relief agencies working in Africa (WFP, GOAL, USAID, World Vision etc), to all the major breweries in Uganda -- as Ruth's own project (Acila) mentions here.

Each of their 9,000 farmers also has their own household which, per Uganda's average household size according to UBOS, has 5 people -- translating to 45,000 people. In other words, Ruth's grain facility, which only costs GBP 339,000 when it is new, has enabled 9,000 households, with over 45,000 people, to directly earn an income two times a year, which income they can use to buy food, clothing, pay tuition for their kids, build decent housing, buy malaria nets if they need them, on a continued basis.

In our own case:

Our two neighboring districts Kamuli & Buyende altogether have 1,123 villages; 165,000+ households (150 - 500 households per village), and over a million people -- and the GBP 339,403 grain facility that we are asking EA to help us install, which has a 15ton/hour cleaning capacity, is capable of handling all the grains from the 165,000 households in Kamuli & Buyende. The only thing that we will need to add (in the future) to enhance our capacity for handling our farmers' produce, is a few more silos.

With the aid of our two local radio stations in Kamuli (KBS and Ssebo FM), expanding our sorghum project to cover every village in Kamuli & Buyende, or at the very least, expanding our sorghum project to reach the same number of households that Ruth is working with, once this facility is installed, won't take long.

In other words, turning the GBP 339,403 that we are asking of EA into a lifeline for 9,000 - 165,000 households in our region, once this facility is in place, won't take long.

A related question someone might ask:  Impact at household level:

What is the potential for individual rural poor households to see an increase in their income levels, e.g. through white sorghum, as a result of installing this grain facility?

First, our intended grain facility, if installed, will create market linkages not just for white sorghum, but also for crops like maize, beans, rice, millet, peas etc which are also bought by large international relief agencies like the WFP (among others), but which rural farmers in our region have previously never had a mainstream market for.

For white sorghum alone, the farmers who are currently taking part in our project in Kamuli & Buyende are averaging 700kg per acre, because the inputs they are using are still very basic — 4kg of seed per acre (which is the seed rate recommended by Uganda Breweries), and liquid fertilizers and pesticides totaling only Ugx 35,000 ($10) per acre. 

However, according to the guidelines that we got from UBL (see page 20), if a farmer embraces the right agronomic practices, e.g., the use of 50kg of DAP/NPK fertilizers twice a season, they can expect a minimum yield of 2.5 - 4 mt/ha, or 1mt – 1.6mt/acre.

The sorghum seed that our farmers currently use comes from GrainPulse, and costs Ugx6,000 ($1.7) per kg or $6.8 for 4kg. The other needed inputs are a spray pump that costs Ugx90,000 ($25), and which can last at least 5 years (equating to $2.5 per season), and a Ugx 60,000 ($17) tarpaulin that can last two planting seasons (i.e. $8.5 per season). So, for those farmers who are only using very basic inputs because they can’t afford the inputs recommended by UBL, the total cost in inputs per acre is $30 (i.e., $6.8 for seed; $10 for fertilizers/pesticides; $5 for a spray pump, and $8 for a tarpaulin). And the average yield in this case is 700kg per acre. 

In the last 5 years, the lowest price UBL has bought white sorghum from local farmers is Ugx 1,050 per kg (in 2019 – 2021); Ugx 1,500 per kg (in 2022 – 2023), and Ugx 1,300 per kg (in March 2024). This means, a farmer who only harvests 700kg from an acre, at the lowest price of Ugx 1,050 per kg, earns Ugx 735,000 ($204) from an acre, or $$408 from two acres, which is $174 and $348 from one acre and two acres respectively after deducting the cost for inputs. And that is before you add other crops (maize, beans etc) that our grain facility, if installed, will create markets for.

How this compares with 61 lives:

In response to my original post 3 weeks ago, one commenter said the GBP 339,403 that we are seeking for our grain facility, if given to a GiveWell-recommended anti-malaria charity, saves 61 lives. Here is how our grain facility stacks up against the 61 lives.

Number-wise, our intended facility, again, is capable of handling all the grains from the 165,000 households in Kamuli & Buyende, or at the very least, 9,000 households (or 45,000 people) that Ruth’s project is currently working with — giving them an income stream twice a year, which income they can use to buy food; pay tuition for their kids, buy new malaria nets if they need them, get descent housing etc, on a continuous basis.

Frequency-wise, the income that rural farmers will earn as a result of installing this grain facility, can bring a poor household a new malaria net every six months, i.e., twice a year, if that household believes a malaria net is a priority. Today, no single global anti-malaria charity, not even those recommended by GiveWell, can place a new malaria net in a rural poor household here in Kamuli twice year — which highlights the importance of supporting local agency in impoverished communities like ours. More on this later).

The average household in our region has 5 people, per the Uganda Bureau of Statistics.

A farmer who earns $174 from one acre every six months (which is the minimum a farmer can earn per acre), and who earns this income twice a year, if they think a malaria net is a priority, can buy five malaria nets for the 5 members of his family at a total cost of just $7*, and still have $167 left each season, or $334 in a year, which they can use to buy food, pay tuition for their kids, improve their housing conditions etc. 

* The most common malaria nets that rural poor households here in Kamuli use, only cost Ugx 5,000 ($1.4) each. However, we also have malaria nets that cost Ugx 18,000 ($5), which is what GiveWell says its recommended charities spend per mosquito net.

If a farmer chooses to buy the $5 malaria nets, they will spend $35 on the 5 new malaria nets for their family every six months, and still have $139 left each season or $278 in a year. Most importantly, every member of their family will have a new malaria net every six months, if they feel having a malaria net is a priority. This is where local agency wins.

A typical rural poor household in a village like ours (i.e., Namisita), usually turns a new malaria net into a total rag in 3 - 6 months, because everything else inside their house is only rags. According to the Uganda Radio Network, “due to poor beddings and housing, a mosquito net hardly takes two months in the house before it's torn into pieces”.  However, there is no such thing as a government program or a global anti-malaria charity that brings a rural poor household here in Namisita or elsewhere in Uganda a new malaria net every 3 -6 months, let alone two months. 

The people who permanently stay at the UCF in Namisita, including myself, are among those who have been receiving free mosquito nets for years, whenever free malaria nets are being given out. From the time nets were handed out at the beginning of COVID in 2020, we received them next towards the end of 2023. It is the same in all other places.

It usually takes 2 -3 years for a rural poor household here to get a free malaria net, regardless of whether that net is coming from the government or a global anti-malaria charity. These nets are supplied through multifaceted partnerships that include the government, GAVI, UNICEF, and all of EA’s recommended charities. Still, all these well-resourced people, even working in partnership, can't provide a poor household a new malaria net every 3 - 6 months. 

So, what happens during those 2-3 years before another free net comes? Or what happens in Busoga’s sugarcane-dependent communities when they have a malaria net but their children are going hungry due to overdependence on sugarcane? This is where local agency comes in, and is why I am very kindly asking EA to help us install our intended grain facility, to give the rural poor in our region the ability to use their own hands to escape poverty.

Note also: with malaria nets, the reason I have used the words “if they believe a malaria net is a priority” multiple times (above), is because here in Kamuli & Buyende, there are many rural poor households who instead use the malaria nets that are given to them, to make fishing nets the same day they receive them. Other households, as the New Vision says here, use these malaria nets instead to “construct bathrooms and chicken houses”. 

Now, this is not to say that malaria nets are not helpful on malaria. It is to say that, if the poor are given the chance to take agency on the challenges they face, only they know better what to start with, and what counts as a priority. For example, those communities here in Kamuli who turn new malaria nets into fishing nets, if they were supported to come up with their own solutions, maybe, they wouldn’t have used the malaria nets that way. Maybe they would have found other sources of money to buy fishing nets, or even come up with other solutions to transform the fishing industry altogether. 

These are the reasons I am asking EA to help us install our intended grain facility, to enable us take local agency on the challenges facing rural poor farmers in our region.

Overall impact of the intended grain facility:

The UCF has already built some initial market linkages for our farmers’ sorghum (like UBL). This facility, if installed, will make many other big buyers to view us as strategic partners, enabling our target farmers to access better markets for their produce. Most importantly, this facility will create market linkages not just for white sorghum, but for many other crops (maize, millet, rice, beans, peas etc), enabling rural farmers to diversify their incomes, and placing them on a self-sustainable path from poverty.

Unlike sugarcane, which can’t be eaten as food, and which has been blamed for severe food shortages across Busoga, all the crops (sorghum, maize, beans, millet etc) that our intended grain facility will be creating market linkages for — and which local farmers will therefore start growing on a large scale because of a new market — are food crops. This will not only help rural poor farmers diversify their incomes and escape poverty, but also, it will contribute significantly to food security in our region.

Also, the UCF currently sells our farmers’ sorghum immediately after harvest, because we don’t have the post-harvest handling capability to keep it longer. This facility, if installed, will not only enhance our capacity to keep our farmers produce free from food contaminants like aflatoxins (which is a prerequisite for big buyers like the WFP), but also, it will give us the choice to keep our farmers’ produce in storage for any period of time, and only sell it off when prices are a bit favorable.

Conclusion:

Since every household in our region depends on agriculture for survival, yet farmers here do not have access to reliable markets for their produce (beyond the beleaguered sugarcane), installing our intended grain facility will be a way of giving the rural poor an alternative path from poverty. I am asking the people from EA to help us do just that.

If possible, I am asking the people from EA to physically work together with us as ONE team on the ground in Uganda, to get this facility installed. Our project, the UCF, is even very ready to provide free local food and onsite accommodation for anyone from the global EA community who would like to work together with us this way. Let’s really do it.