This is a linkpost for a paper of mine (forthcoming in Analysis) arguing that we need not interpret Buddhism as pessimistic about our existence. (The paper is just under 4k words and written for a generalist philosophical audience.) I'm posting it here for two reasons. First, some nontrivial fraction of EA appears to be drawn to views in the vicinity of negative utilitarianism and/or so-called 'minimalist axiologies'. These views have important implications for global prioritization. I believe these views are mistaken, but that a pessimistic reading of Buddhism offers the best defense of them. So, one can find in my argument against the pessimistic reading of Buddhism an indirect argument against the sorts of views (negative utilitarianism etc.) I have in mind here. Second, casual observation suggests to me that there is decent crossover among EAs, rationalists, and meditators in mindfulness and/or insight traditions, so I hope the essay will be of interest to anyone who is interested in Buddhism by way of meditation :)

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I am happy to grant, from a Buddhist perspective, that the sum total of human welfare, from the beginning of our species through the present, has been negative. I am even willing to suppose, again from a Buddhist perspective, that total human welfare in the present is negative.

Ah, I'm so relieved we can reject pessimism! ;)

I read the paper, then asked Claude 3 to summarise. I endorse the following summary as accurate:

The key argument in this paper is that Buddhism is not necessarily committed to pessimistic views about the value of unawakened human lives. Specifically, the author argues against two possible pessimistic Buddhist positions:

  1. The Pessimistic Assumption - the view that any mental state characterized by dukkha (dissatisfaction, unease, suffering) is on balance bad. 
  2. The Pessimistic Conclusion - the view that over the course of an unawakened life, dukkha will always outweigh the good.

Against the Pessimistic Assumption, the author contends that even if an experience contains some element of dukkha, it can still be good overall if its positive features outweigh the negative ones. The mere presence of dukkha does not make an experience bad on balance.

Against the Pessimistic Conclusion, the author argues that once we reject the Pessimistic Assumption and allow that some discrete unawakened experiences can be good overall, then given the right causes and conditions, it's possible for a whole unawakened life to be good on balance, even if it necessarily contains a nontrivial amount of dukkha.

The core claim is that while Buddhism regards dukkha as pervasive in unawakened existence, this is compatible with unawakened lives sometimes being good overall. Dukkha is an inevitable bad-making feature, but other good-making features can potentially outweigh it. Thus, Buddhism need not be committed to a pessimistic assessment of unawakened human lives.

Wow, this is good - go Claude 3! 

Thanks for this. 

I take the central claim to be:

Even if an experience contains some element of dukkha, it can still be good overall if its positive features outweigh the negative ones. The mere presence of dukkha does not make an experience bad on balance.

I agree with this, and also agree that it's often overlooked.

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