In my previous piece, I argued that the definitional ambiguity at the heart of Effective Altruism enables a kind of ideological drift among its proponents. This conceptual flexibility has fostered a diffusion of focus within the movement, transforming Effective Altruism into a “moral marketplace”. I argued that if these internal tensions remain, we are likely to witness a resurgence of “effective giving” as the movement’s primary mode of engagement. I’ve thought about that last piece a bit more, and here’s the issue: 

I’m wrong.

In my earlier argument, I suggested that, as collective momentum within Effective Altruism begins to fracture due to an emergence of factions grounded in different normative commitments, the movement risks succumbing to a kind of market logic. 

As differing value systems naturally orient individuals toward distinct priorities, the once-unified pursuit of “doing good” fragments into a plurality of cause-specific agendas. In this context, causes may no longer be championed primarily for the truth of their claims or the quality of their research, but rather for their ability to attract attention, funding, and donor interest from within the community. Effective Altruism, in this light, begins to resemble a competitive marketplace in which campaigns and organisations function like startups, competing for limited resources and moral capital. Since a cause’s survival increasingly hinges on sustained financial backing, monetary contributions regain their centrality. Consequently, charitable giving reemerges as the primary mode of moral engagement. It becomes a means of keeping causes afloat and visible within a crowded economy of altruistic attention.

In an increasingly competitive moral economy, the imperative shifts from collaborative moral progress to outperforming rival initiatives. Without securing a dominant position in this marketplace of causes, no initiative will garner sufficient traction, and scarce resources will be diluted across too many competing efforts. Regardless of the strength of a movement’s research or the soundness of its ethical reasoning, it cannot prevail without the financial capital to amplify its message through campaigns, outreach, and further development. Inevitably, this creates pressure to solicit more funding. 

Thus, for many within the movement, the most practical way to “do good” becomes channelling money into their preferred cause or organisation. This is not necessarily to advance it in isolation, but to ensure it outcompetes others. “Doing good”, then, is increasingly reframed as a matter of ideological competition: securing moral dominance for one’s vision of the good by outpacing rival interpretations. Victory in this contest becomes the precondition for enacting one’s altruistic goals.

There’s quite a big a problem with that argument.

The jump between the premises “Effective Altruism is fragmented into ideological factions that prioritise different cause areas” and “therefore, the movement becomes a competition between campaigns and charities for the support of these factions” (which ultimately supports the later conclusion) requires an additional bridging premise. 

That missing premise is this: “cause areas within Effective Altruism are primarily, if not exclusively, in competition for attention and funding from within the Effective Altruism community itself”. 

In other words, we must assume a kind of semi-closed-loop moral economy, in which Effective Altruism aligned individuals and institutions function as the principal, if not sole, allocators of resources. If this internal economic framework is granted, for a cause to succeed, it must outcompete others for finite Effective Altruism resources. This necessitates increased emphasis on visibility, persuasion, and donor appeal, thus elevating financial contributions as the most effective and scalable form of engagement. With this premise in place, the conclusion holds: “effective giving” reemerges not simply as an option, but as a structural imperative within Effective Altruism. 

However, this assumption overlooks an important reality: many of the causes promoted within Effective Altruism also receive significant attention and funding from outside of the movement.

Climate change mitigation, global health, AI safety, and animal welfare (all Effective-Altruism-supported initiatives) already attract interest from governments, corporations, academic institutions, and non-Effective-Altruism philanthropic networks. This means that the competition for internal Effective Altruism funding is partially offset by a plurality of external funding streams. As a result, the internal “moral marketplace” is not as zero-sum or self-enclosed as I previously suggested.

When this is taken into account, the disproportionate attention received by certain Effective-Altruism-aligned causes does not, in itself, necessitate a reversion to “effective giving” as the dominant means to “do good” within the movement. This is because such causes attract funding not only from within the Effective Altruism community but also from a broader philanthropic ecosystem. In this expanded view of the moral economy, resource allocation is no longer confined to Effective-Altruism-affiliated individuals and institutions, but extends to a wider array of actors engaged in charitable giving and philanthropic investment. If we understand the pool of potential contributors to be much broader, the competitive pressure to secure funding from within the Effective Altruism movement alone is substantially diminished.

Without such financial dependency on Effective Altruists alone, Effective Altruism causes are less likely to become embroiled in zero-sum competition for internal support, reducing the likelihood that the whole movement evolves into a highly competitive moral marketplace where monetary contributions are the central metric of impact. Consequently, there is little reason to believe that internal resource competition would become so intense as to force a structural return to “effective giving” as the primary mechanism for “doing good” in Effective Altruism as a whole.

In this scenario, Effective Altruism as a movement can theoretically remain pluralistic in its theory of change, continuing to recommend a diverse array of strategies to its proponents (including direct work, research, policy engagement, institutional reform, and yes, in some cases, earning to give) without defaulting to charitable donation as the primary or exclusive model for impact.

So, this is a pretty good challenge to my earlier argument. Namely, it rests on an unstated assumption between two of its key premises, an assumption that does not hold up under closer scrutiny. However, this is perhaps less a counterargument in the traditional sense and more an exposure of a flaw in my reasoning. I am entirely willing to concede a point there. The omission of this assumption was an oversight, and I acknowledge that it should have been more carefully considered and explicitly addressed in my original analysis. 

In revisiting my earlier argument, then, I’ve come to see its central prediction (that Effective Altruism would inevitably return to “effective giving” as its dominant mode of engagement) as too broad, and grounded in an overly insular conception of the moral economy in which Effective Altruism operates. If we understand the pool of potential contributors to be much larger, the competitive pressure to secure funding from within the Effective Altruism movement alone is substantially diminished and charitable donation as the primary or exclusive model for impact is not a necessary consequence.

And that’s where I’ll leave it—for now. Bear in mind, however, that this conversation isn’t over. I’m not prepared to lay down my argument entirely. While my original reasoning may have been flawed in part, I don’t believe it was wholly mistaken. But sometimes, the best way to think clearly is to pause, revise, and return with sharper tools. I’ll see you in the next one.