Sorry, that wasn't super clear. I'm saying that if you believe that there is more total suffering in a human-controlled future than in a future not controlled by humans, X-risk reduction would be problematic from the point of view you defend in your post.

So if you endorse this point of view, you should either believe x-risk reduction is bad or that there isn't more total suffering in a human-controlled future. Believing either of those would be unusual (although this doesn't mean you're wrong) which is why I was curious.

Mogensen and Wiblin discuss this problem in this podcast episode, fwiw. That's all I know, sorry.

Btw, if you really endorse your solution (and ignore potential aliens colonizing our corner of the universe someday, maybe), I think you should find deeply problematic GCP's take (and the take of most people on this Forum) on the value of reducing X-risks. Do you agree or do you believe the future of our light cone with humanity around doing things will not contain any suffering (or anything that would be worse than the suffering of one Jones in the “Transmitter Room Problem”)? You got me curious.

I would even take this further and argue that your chain of reasoning could be applied to most causes (perhaps even all?), which seems valid.

Would you disagree with this?

I mean, I didn't actually give any argument for why I don't believe AI safety is good overall (assuming pure longtermism, i.e., taking into account everything from now until the end of time). I just said that I would believe it if there was evidence robust to unknown unknowns. (I haven't argued that there wasn't such evidence already; although the burden of the proof is very much on the opposite claim tbf). But I think this criterion applies to all causes where unknown unknowns are substantial, and I believe this is all of them as long as we're evaluating them from a pure longtermist perspective, yes. And whether there is any cause that meets this criterion depends on one's values I think. From a classical utilitarian perspective (and assuming the trade-offs between suffering and pleasure that most longtermists endorse), for example, I think there's very plausibly none that does meet this criterion.

If you do have a determinate credence above 50% for AI safety work, how do you arrive at this conclusion?

It happens that I do not. But I would if I believed there was evidence robust to unknown unknowns in favor of assuming "AI Safety work" is good, factoring in all the possible consequences from now until the end of time. This would require robust reasons to believe that current AI safety work actually increases rather than decreases safety overall AND that increased safety is actually good all things considered (e.g., that human disempowerment is actually bad overall). (See Guillaume's comment on the distinction). I won't elaborate on what would count as "evidence robust to unknown unknowns" in such a context but this is a topic for a future post/paper, hopefully.

Next, I want to push back on your claim that if ii) is correct, everything collapses. I agree that this would lead to the conclusion that we are probably entirely clueless about longtermist causes, probably the vast majority of causes in the world. However, it would make me lean toward near-term areas with much shorter causal chains, where there is a smaller margin of error—for example, caring for your family or local animals, which carry a low risk of backfiring.

Sorry, I didn't mean to argue against that. I just meant that work you are clueless about (e.g. maybe AI safety work in your case?) shouldn't be given any weight in your diversified portfolio. I didn't mean to make any claim about what I personnally think we should or shouldn't be clueless about. The "everything falls apart" was unclear and probably unwarranted.

Do you think that AI safety is i) at least a bit good in expectation (but like with a determinate credence barely higher than 50% because high risk/uncertainty) or ii) you don't have determinate credences and feel clueless/agnostic about this? I feel like your post implicitly keeps jumping back and forth between these two positions, and only (i) could support your conclusions. If we assume (ii), everything falls apart. There's no reason to support a cause X (or the exact opposite of X) to any degree if one is totally clueless about whether it is good.

Thanks for writing this :)

Influence on cosmic actors seems not only "plausible" but inevitable to me. Everything we do influences them in expectation, even if extremely indirectly (e.g., anything that directly or indirectly reduces X-risks reduces the likelihood of alien counterfactuals and increases that of interaction between our civilization and alien ones). The real questions seem to be i) how crucial is this influence for evaluating whether the work we do is good or bad; and ii) whether we can predictably influence them (right now, we know we are influencing them; we simply have no idea if this is in a way that makes the future better or worse). I think your first section gives good arguments in favor of answering "plausibly quite crucial" to (i). As for (ii), your fourth section roughly responds "maybe, but we'd yet have to figure out precisely how" which seems fair (although, fwiw, I think I'm more skeptical than you that we'll ever find evidence robust enough to warrant updating away from radical agnosticism on whether our influence on cosmic actors makes the future better or worse).

Also, this is unrelated to the point of your post but I think your second section should invite us to reflect on whether longtermists can/should ignore the unpredictable (see, e.g., this recent comment thread and the references therein) since this may be a key -- and controversial -- assumption behind the objections you respond to.

Thanks for this interesting post :)

I'd be very curious to know who's working or considering working on questions mentioned in 1.2.1 Cluelessness, Unawareness, and Deep Uncertainty and/or 4.2.1 Severe Uncertainty, in case anyone reading this happens to be able to enlighten me. :)

Thanks for the post. Nice to see an up-to-date version of GPI's research agenda!

Oh interesting, I would have guessed you'd endorse some version of B or come up with a C, instead. 

Iirc, these resources I referenced don't directly address Owen's points to justify A, though. Not sure. I'll look into this and where they might be more straightforwardly addressed, since this seems quite important w.r.t. the work I'm currently doing. Happy to keep you updated if you want.

Oh my bad. I don't think it's really a crux, then. Or not the most key one at least. I guess I can't narrow it down to more precise than whether your "fact[*]" is true, in that case. And it looks like I misunderstood the assumptions behind your justification of it. 

I'll brush upon my little knowledge of the literature on unawareness -- maybe dive deeper -- and see to what extent your "fact[*]" was already discussed. I'm sure it was. Then, I'll go back to your justification of it to see if I understand it better and whether I actually can say I disagree.

Thanks for all your thoughts!

Thanks a lot for developing on that! To confirm whether we've identified at least one of the cruxes, I'd be curious to know what you think of what follows.

Say I am clueless about the (dis)value of the alien counterfactual we should expect (i.e., whether another civ someday replacing our own after we go extinct or something would be better or worse than if it was ours maintaining control over our corner of the Universe). One consideration I have identified is that there is, all else equal, a selection effect against caring about suffering for grabby civs. But all else is ofc not equal and there might be plenty of considerations I haven't thought of and/or never will be aware of supporting the opposite or other relevant considerations that have nothing to do with care for suffering. I'm clueless. By, 'I'm clueless', I don't mean 'I have a 50% credence the alien counterfactual is better'. Instead, I mean 'my credence is severely indeterminate/imprecise, such that I can't compute the expected value of reducing X-risks (unless I decide to give up on impartial consequentialism and ignore things like the alien counterfactual which I'm clueless about)' (for a case for how cluelessness threatens expected value reasoning in such a way, see e.g. Mogensen 2021).

Your above argument is based on the assumption that our credences all ought to be determinate/precise and that cluelessness = 50% credence, right? It's probably not worth discussing further in here whether this assumption is justified but do you also think that's one of the cruxes, here?