Really nicely written and interesting post. I have one part I'd like to question.

Often defences of inequality take the form "You can either have rich and poor, or you can just have poor". Which on the face of it is not just a zero-sum frame, but actually a negative-sum frame, which seems an unfair representation until you add the claim that it is inequality itself that allows for the sort of dynamic wealth generation needed to create the rich. The point about Michelangelo and Yo-Yo Ma makes an argument of the same type but regarding cultural riches. But I think this misses the point that cultural dynamism transcends wealth distribution. Take the idea of genius for instance.

I don't doubt that Yo-Yo Ma is a genius, and that Michelangelo may have been one too, though I think Leonardo is a better candidate for genius. The framing goes if there wasn't inequality that allowed for funding a life of contemplation for such geniuses they never would have arisen. I think the opposite is more likely.

Let's assume that Leonardo is a genuine 1 in 10,000 genius. Let's put him in a population of 1,000,000, where 1% of the population have the capacity to fully reach their potential, while the other 99% live in an agricultural or later industrial state of perpetual labour, and never get to reach their potential. Lucky Leonardo, he's the one genius who arises in this situation 1,000,000 x 1% = 10,000 and one in 10,000 people are geniuses so, that's one genius reaching their potential.

So, now let's allow for a more egalitarian society, where everyone works, but not for ever hour of the day, they get some time to contemplate the world, and be creative. Now out of your population of 1,000,000 you have 100 genuine 1 in 10,000 geniuses, each with a chance of being discovered.

What world is more likely to create the greatest art and have the greatest progress? I think it's obvious: the latter. You see, it's important to recognise that we don't necessarily live in the best of all possible worlds, the past isn't by definition the best it might have been, so the depictions of old biblical stories by Michelangelo aren't necessarily the best artworks that might have been created.

I don't find the decision about Notre Dame difficult in the slightest. It's a building, it's not lives, lives have value, buildings only have value in as much as the serve lives, and it's difficult to make the case that the pleasure or national income that Notre Dame generates gets even close to the benefit of saving the lives that the equivalent funds could save.

There are other interesting points in the post, but this is one I feel could be pushed back against. At the same time I completely agree with @Ian Turner when he points out that criticism of charitable choices is often more prevalent than criticism of not giving to charity at all. So, I think it's advisable to use positive terminology when assessing efficacy, as "in which of these two good options is better" rather than the zero-sum framing that not effectively giving is tantamount to taking away from a more effective charity.

Thanks for making me aware of Requiredism, this resonates with and strongly overlaps with the my take. Looks like, had I looked a little harder I might have found that what I was looking for was (of course) already out there. Though it was worth fleshing it out myself, and my focus on the centrality of consciousness is important to a wider ethical framework I'm developing. Requiredism seems a good counterpoint to the Compatibilist Illusionism I was attributing to Compatibilism in general.

Thanks, I've made this edit—the capitalisation comes from the original where it's more cartoonish and seems less shouty, but here, yes unintentional shouting :)

Thanks Arturo, and yes, I found it very interesting. I find the passage you've pulled particularly interesting in terms of AGI which seems to be following the same notion of "de-instinctivation" substitution narrow hardwiring for the ability to adapt to general situations.

I also found the critique of Utilitarian impartiality interesting, and it helped clarify my thinking in terms of the simulation. This model actually is founded on cognitive bias, treating it as a feature rather than a bug. So, incoming beliefs are only ever adopted when aligned with pre-existing beliefs and yet it is still impartial in that, given a conflicting belief an agent will always choose the strongest coalition of beliefs, letting beliefs with negative marginal value go freely. This is actually a very reasonable way to adopt beliefs (because we can only ever make decisions based on our prior knowledge) and yet has the natural result of bias that we observe in humans.

Thanks for providing that link Nathan, that does seem to significantly undermine the Mani et al study. While I agree with you that at this point primary studies should be, by default, seen as not credible, it did help a lot (in terms of convincing me personally) to see a study specifically designed to replicate the Mani et al study.

Do you find any evidence for the conclusions in the post credible? Or are you aware of more credible studies that would support the argument the post makes? You seem to know your stuff, so, I don't want to waste your time, but I would value your input about whether the post's position is tenable at all given the available evidence.

I don't want to be posting nonsense, so depending on the evidence available I would either rewrite it with more reliable evidence, or take it down.

Thanks for your comment. I've been aware than this perspective is prevalent, but I haven't actually seen examples of where replication of the same study has been attempted, I have only seen some that introduce other major factors that one would expect to influence results. The link you sent me to criticises priming in a broad way, pointing to heuristics like the effect being too large to be believable, which seems a pretty subjective judgment.

The link specifically criticises Danny Kahneman for using priming in small studies to make large generalisations, and in Kahneman's response he makes a fairly good rebuttal. The one thing he concedes is the small size of the studies he used, which is not the case in the priming case used in this post, which involved a series of studies with several hundred participants each.

I appreciate that I might be incorrect to have confidence in these studies, in light of the widely held opinion that priming studies are not reliable, but I'm yet to see the specific studies that have attempted, and failed, to replicate these specific studies.

Hi Nathan,

Thanks for your response, and I see your point, the more specific the parameters get, the less general the conclusions can be.

To explain, my purpose in using a simulation is to illustrate a phenomenon that is perhaps too complex to reduce to a formula, because it seeks to emulate some aspects of society that are often not accounted for in game-theoretical models. Simulations allow for complex parameters to provide a sort of empirical evidence for principles that might not be able to be proven mathematically (by me at least).

The reason I've chosen the parameters I have, is not to create an inevitable outcome, but to reflect aspects of the real world that are not usually considered in game-theoretical models, like for instance the instinctive animal behaviour to avoid agents with whom you've had previous negative experiences. This is difficult to model mathematically, but is never-the-less a significant factor when creating a model that applies to the real world.

The stipulation that no one dies is a simplification that serves two purposes:

1. It reflects the self-balancing nature of human systems in the simplest way possible (modelling death and reproduction, social welfare, health and other systems that maintain a society's population would be unwieldy—and even more specific).
2. It gets the population past the inevitable point of total collapse that happens if the defectors are able to essentially kill other agents during their dominant phase.

So, the specifics of the model are not meant to be arbitrary, but reflective of features of actual populations of people or other animals. The aim was to better approximate real world dynamics rather than the siloed game-environments which often result in conclusions that don't comport with common sense—not because common sense is wrong or the theory is wrong but because the game-environment is too limited.

Your point is important though, and if I develop this further I would think about introducing controls for the initial ratio of the agents (cooperators:defectors) and less specifics preserving survival, so collapse becomes a feature determined by the ratio. Other controllable parameters might also help to give the user a more intuitive feel for the effects of various dynamics on the system.

Thanks, I think I may have used the wrong term "source"-based, meaning "origin" or "residence"-based. I was meaning that generally a company is taxed in the country where their offices are, not where their consumers are.

That was refreshing change of pace :) Thanks for posting.

Great article! This seems like a valuable avenue for people with the relevant skills.

I’m interested in your observation that poorer countries tend to prefer a source country-based tax, while wealthier countries lean toward a consumer country-based tax. However, it seems paradoxical that OECD countries, which hold stronger influence over international tax law, have led us to a predominantly source country-based tax system. Could you comment on why think this is the case?

I’ve been interested in the idea of a consumer country-based tax ever since I worked on a film with Thomas Piketty, which loosely covered his Capital in the 21st Century. If I understood his view correctly, a consumer country-based tax could potentially help eliminate tax havens because companies can’t control where their consumers are in the same way they can control where their offices are based.

I'd love to hear your insights about this.