When new people joined the Research Scholars Programme recently, someone asked me what I thought all of them should read.
I think the only serious answer to this question is: There may not be a single such thing. People's circumstances just vary too much. And if there was something it would be good for everyone to read, it would be unclear if I could tell.
Nevertheless, I found this prompt surprisingly useful. I'm sharing my half-serious answer below. If I spent another hour on this, it would probably add things, and might remove others.
I would be interested in other people's answers to this question - even (and maybe especially) if they're similarly half-serious or off-the-cuff. To be clear, I'm not hoping to generate a "definite" reading list or anything like that, and I would be pretty worried if people took responses too seriously. However, I do think it might surface some interesting leads for some readers including myself.
I suspect that the appropriate reaction to my answer is like 80% "this tells me something about Max", 15% "maybe some things in here are actually useful for me to read, but maybe not", and 5% "this tells me something about the world". I suspect it does fairly poorly at "being a well-prioritized and comprehensive reading list anyone should use as-is".
I remember that reading up on normative ethics was one of the first things I focused on after I had encountered EA. I'm sure it was useful in many ways. For some reason, however, I feel surprisingly lukewarm about recommending that people read about normative ethics.
It could be because my view these days is roughly: "Once you realize that consequentialism is great as a 'criterion of rightness' but doesn't work as 'decision procedure' for boundedly rational agents, a lot of the themes from deontology, virtue ethics, moral particularism, and moral pluralism become relevant again - through a backdoor as it were. It is therefore kind of misleading to think of consequentialism vs. deontology vs. virtue ethics as alternative theories, which however is the way normative ethics is typically presented in the analytic tradition."
Fortunately, if I remember correctly, something like the distinction between the true criterion of rightness and the best practical decision procedure actually is a major theme in the Kagan book. (Although I think the distinction probably often is underemphasized.)
I agree there is something to this concern. But I still wouldn't go so far as to say that it's misleading to think of them as alternative theories. I do think they count as conceptually distinct (even if the boundaries are sometimes a bit muddy), and I think they do sometimes have different implications for how you should in fact make moral decisions.
Beyond the deontology/consequentialism debate, I think there are also relevant questions around demandingness (how strong are our moral obligations, if any?), on the nature of well-being (e.g. hedonistic vs. preference-based vs. objective list theories), on the set of things that count as morally relevant consequences (e.g. do things beyond well-being matter? should we care more about totals or averages?), and so on.